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According to previous research, institution influences choice of the 
entrants and needs for resources impact entry strategies in 
different contexts. This perspective calling for considerations of 
institutional effects with their integration with RBV, however, lacks 
delicacy in that many firms nowadays seek for both tangible and 
intangible asset simultaneously. 
By setting CEO’s attitude towards risk, this paper can explore 
beyond Meyer(2008)’s review, which focused on the ‘cost’ side 
rather than ‘risk’ involved. Going beyond transaction cost and 
information cost, risk management actually matters in choosing 
entry mode of FDI. By focusing on each risk of entry mode choices, 
we can see how CEO’s attitude actually influences entry mode 
decisions, through the CEO’s perception of the risk involved. 
To be specific, this paper examines how multinational companies 
choose among three modes of entry of FDI; JV, acquisition, and 
Greenfield operation. Hypotheses are tested by survey data with 
archival data from Korean Biotechnology Industry. Korean 
companies enter into 7 different Asian countries which show 
variation in the development degree of the institutions. 
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How do companies decide their entry mode? From previous 
research, one can infer that top management team or CEO’ s 
characteristics play a big role in company’s everyday decisions. 
CEO’s attitude towards risk, in this manner, would play a big role 
regarding change of strategies, including situations regarding FDI 
entry mode. While common consensus among CEOs is to avoid risks, 
some CEOs indeed do enjoy exhibiting aggressive actions and 
taking initiatives. But even considering for the individual differences, 
no CEOs would refuse to choose optimal entry mode for the 
company. That is, CEOs would be assumed as rational enough to 
consider what is best for the company, albeit bounded in the 
process. 
Past literature, especially Hambrick and Mason’s (1984) work 
constitutes the base of the research on the ‘upper echelon’ of 
organizations. In contrast to organizational demography research 
that emphasizes demographic make-up of organizations, Hambrick 
and Mason emphasizes organization ’ s top level, stating that 
characteristics of the upper echelon and executive preferences 
affect firm’s outcomes. According to Hambrick, what manager 
brings to a TMT decision depends on managerial perceptions and 
interpretations which in turn influences firm ’ s subsequent 
strategic choices. Then, how would managerial perception of the 
risk interact with the institutional context?  
Although previous literature of institutional theory has developed 
many explanations for antecedents and consequences of FDI and 
entry mode, it did not really focus on the risk the underdeveloped 
institutional context possesses. Rather, it focused on the transaction 
cost or information cost the weak institutional context incurred on 
the focal firm. The perceived risk that reflected institutional 
strength could influence company’s entry mode decision, but there 
were none of the research questions regarding institutional context 
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influencing CEO’s risk management, ultimately affecting the choice 
of entry mode decisions.   
This paper builds on and integrates literatures on upper echelons, 
institution and test a model of whether the degree of the influence 
institutional development exerts on entry mode decision is 
moderated by CEO’s attitude towards risk. 
 
 
In determining foreign market entry strategies, institutions in the 
host economy significantly matters. (Peng, 2003; Wright et al., 
2005). Macro-level institutions affect transaction costs (North, 
1990). In contrast to traditional transaction cost research 
(Williamson, 1985) new era of research suggests that institutions 
matter more than background conditions to formulate and implement 
strategy (Ingram and Silverman, 2002). In emerging economies, 
institutional frameworks differ greatly and the influence of 
institutions can be examined in this context. 
According to Meyer (2008), institution influences choice of the 
entrants and needs for resources impact entry strategies in 
different contexts. This perspective calling for considerations of 
institutional effects with their integration with RBV, however, lacks 
delicacy in that many firms nowadays do not seek either tangible 
asset or intangible assets only. They seek for both tangible and 
intangible asset simultaneously and in this case, separate entry 
mode decision become meaningless.  
By setting CEO’s attitude towards risk, this paper can explore 
beyond Meyer(2008)’s review, which focused on the ‘cost’ 
side rather than ‘risk’ involved. Going beyond transaction cost 
and information cost, risk management actually matters in choosing 
entry mode of FDI. By focusing on each risk of entry mode choices, 
we can see how CEO’s attitude actually influences entry mode 
decisions, through the CEO’s perception of the risk involved. 
To be specific, this paper examines how multinational companies 
choose among three modes of entry of FDI; JV, acquisition, and 
Greenfield operation. Hypotheses are tested by survey data with 
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archival data from Korean Biotechnology Industry. Korean 
companies enter into 7 different Asian countries which show 
variation in the development degree of the institutions.  
Overall, this paper makes two contributions to the literature. First, 
this paper explores institution-based literature view(Oliver, 1997; 
Peng, 2003) by following Meyer(2008)’s notion of analysis in the 
relationship between institutional influence and entry modes. 
Primary hypotheses follows Meyer(2008) ’ s suggestion that 
reliance on a partner in joint venture reduces with the institutional 
development. At the same time this paper suggests that CEO’s 
risk aversive attitude increases the preference for acquisition and 
JV, but not greenfield. Second, this paper argues that institutions 
moderate CEO ’ s attitude towards risk when choosing entry 
strategies. More specifically, if institutional development is not 
strong enough JVs are used to avoid too big a risk. However, where 
institutions are strong and when market effectiveness is ensured, 
JVs become less efficient while acquisitions become a more 





2. THORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
2.1 Entry mode choices 
 
The modes of FDI can be classified into Greenfield, acquisition or 
JV (Kogut and Singh, 1988). JVs and acquisitions both provide 
access to resources of local firms, but the difference is that JVs 
partially provide access to local resources from a local partner and 
acquisitions allow firms to integrate as a whole. A greenfield does 
not provide a bundle of resources straightforward, but entering firm 
can use markets in the local area for resources. 
 
 ６ 
In theory, three modes are apart from each other and suffices 
different motives. But most research has used frameworks that 
suggest the choices to be sequential and bimodal (Anderson and 
Gatignon, 1986) However, it was Meyer’s paper 『Institutions, 
Resources, and Entry Strategies in emerging economies』 that first 
brought into focus the possibility that the process of choosing entry 
mode might not be sequential as suggested, but simultaneous and 
intertwined. Since the degree of the development of the institutional 
framework influences the entry mode decisions in a simultaneous 
process, the three entry mode should be assessed in this interaction 
respect.  
Acquisition and Joint ventures are considered the optimal way to 
access the ready-made resources from another organization. The 
question is for which reason entrants do not exploit the local market 
for the resource, that is, exploit the efficiency of doing it oneself 
with broad options to choose from? Standard market transactions 
should be the basic and at the same time best option if market-
efficiency is secured. Acquisition poses major challenges of 
management in acquired business (Capron and Swaminathan, 2001), 
and JV creates considerable coordination challenges (Kogut, 1988; 
Buckley and Casson, 1998). Thus, if the local market is sufficiently 
efficient, investors could go through standard market transactions 
and choose greenfield operation (Meyer, 2008) Not only greenfield 
operations but also markets for acquisitions may be problematic in 
emerging economies (Peng and Heath, 1996). All in all, markets for 
local resources may be suboptimal due to surrounding institutional 
environment (North, 1990; Peng, 2006).  
 
2.2 Institutions and Entry Strategies 
 
Institutions support efficient functioning of the market so that 
individuals can engage in transactions freely with low cost (North, 
1990; Peng, 2009). These institutions include the legal framework 
and the degree to which it is enforced. (Meyer, 2008) Institutional 
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development is deemed to be ‘strong’ if they enhance voluntary 
exchange while deemed as ‘weak’ if they fail to do so.  
Institutional differences matters for MNEs operating in multiple 
geographical contexts (Globerman and Shapiro, 1999). Formal rules 
directly formulate possible choices of entry mode but informal rules 
indirectly influence on mode decisions. Legally one country could 
limit the equity stake of foreign investors (Delios and Beamish, 
1999) and informal values, such as ethics regarding bribery may 
disadvantage MNEs (Peng, 2003). Since it is costly to engage in 
business in these markets, companies have to come up with new 
strategies to overcome restraints (Peng, 2009). Institutions also 
provide information about business to reduce information 
asymmetries (Arrow, 1971; Casson, 1997). Therefore weak 
institutional frameworks magnify information asymmetries so firms 
face higher risks (Meyer, 2001) Institutional strength interferes 
with the costs of business (Estrin, 2002) and influences investor’s 
mode decisions by moderating the costs of acquisition or greenfield 
operations (Williamson, 1985). In consequence, the relative costs, 
especially transaction cost and information cost of entry modes are 
influenced by the institutional framework (Henisz, 2000; Meyer, 
2001). For instance, JVs makes it possible for the entrants to 
access networks that correspond to institutional weakness (Delios, 
1999). Not only cost, but also to hedge ‘risk’ of underdeveloped 
institutional context, joint venture is preferred as a strategy to 
transfer the risk to the local partner. Consequently, the necessity of 
a partner may fall short as the institutional framework is developed 
(Meyer, 2001; Peng, 2003; Steensma et al., 2005). For example, an 
elimination of restrictions on FDI may make JV partner unnecessary 
for interface with local authorities or local businesses (Peng, 2006). 
Acquisition is also sensitive to the efficiency of financial markets 
(Peng, 2009).  
Combining these arguments, investors need access to local 
resources to counteract absence of efficiency in weak institutions. 
However, weak institutional development brings obstacles to access 
these resources via greenfield entry and raises the costs of 
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acquisitions. On the other hand, JV function as a tool to gain 
resources while drastically reducing the risk and cost involved by a 
partner. Therefore, in accordance with Meyer’s paper hypothesis 
1 is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis1:  if the institutional strength is firm enough, companies 
would not prefer JV, when choosing an entry mode. 
 
 
2.3 CEO Characteristics and Entry Mode 
 
Considerable research has focused on CEO characteristics, such as 
functional background experience, tenure, and educational level and 
its relationship with firm strategies; CEO characteristics that are 
considered valid proxies for the orientation of the firm. (Finkelstein 
and Hambrick, 1996). Since entry-mode choices are included in 
key strategic decisions, the influence CEO characteristics exert on 
entry mode decisions should be examined in this manner as well, 
for Entry mode choice bas been a "very important, if not critical, 
strategic decision"(Agarwal and Karnaswami, 1992, p. 2). Research 
on entry mode selection has been based on several theoretical 
perspectives, including transactions cost economics, industrial 
organization, and strategic behavior, using various antecedent 
factors to explain entry-mode decisions.(Herrmann and Datta, 
2002) However, the role of CEO was neglected in research, and, 
although CEOs play key roles in the choice of entry modes 
(Conference Board, 1995), research on how their characteristics 
influence entry mode choices is noticeably ignored. (Herrmann and 
Datta, 2002) 
The empirical literature on CEO's characteristics, strategic 
choices, and firm performance has been based largely on the upper 
echelons theory which argue that managers' cognitive orientation 
influence the perceptual process behind strategic decision making 
(Herrmann and Datta, 2002) CEO’s attitude towards risk, in this 
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manner, would play a big role regarding change of strategies, 
including situations regarding FDI entry mode.  
All in all, differences in managers' cognitive perspectives and 
underlying psychological orientation affect decision-making 
process, regarding entry mode as well. Empirical support comes 
from studies that have found top management characteristics to be 
related to firms' strategic orientations (Herrmann and Datta, 2002) 
For instance, Miller(1982) found that companies with aggressive 
CEOs adopted risky and innovative strategies, whereas those timid 
CEOs formulated conservative strategies, suggesting how CEO’s 
characteristics influence their own choice of strategies. Each entry 
mode choices allow different degree of ownership and control, and 
Firms can choose full control and ownership by greenfieid or 
acquisitions, or shared control by joint ventures. (Herrmann and 
Datta, 2002) The decision on the extent of control and ownership is 
often directly related to manager’s attitude towards risk. Among 
three entry modes to choose from, there are differences in risk 
exposure (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 1992). Although the concept of 
risk itself is quite abstract and ambiguous, it is widely 
acknowledged that Full-control entry modes are typically more 
susceptible to environmental uncertainties and involve greater 
exposure to political risks.  
Literature on managerial risk taking (Knight 1921, von Neuman 
and Morgenstern 1947, and Arrow 1965) has provided some insight 
in process of CEO’s decision making (Bloom & Milkovich, 1998; 
Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). However, the literature itself 
cannot solve the problem of endogenous ‘ambiguity’ the notion 
deals with. What would be the essential elements of risk? Definition 
by Bloom and Milkovich (1998: 285) as "uncertainty about 
outcomes or events." cannot be helpful in that there are 
uncertainties virtually everywhere regarding managerial decisions. 
Hambrick’s paper, however, deals with the notion of risk. In this 
paper, we will follow Hambrick’s definition of risk-taking and 
follow his analysis of risk’s components. He defined risk as the 
degree to which potential outcomes associated with a decision are 
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consequential, vary widely, and include the possibility of extreme 
loss(Hambrick, 2007) risk of a managerial decision can be classified 
into three categories: the size, the variation, and the possibility of 
failure. First of all, bigger the investment is, the bigger the 
exposure and risk. The second factor in risk taking is the variance 
of the outcome, while the third element is maximum loss the firm 
might face. Agency theory states that CEOs without proper 
compensations will be risk-averse. Since shareholders are more 
diversified in terms of their possession, they want CEOs to be more 
risk-taking, and to fill the gap design incentive system such as 
stock options.   
All in all, according to three dimensions of risk, we can certify 
that full-control entry modes are more risky, since it is more 
vulnerable to environmental uncertainties and external 
contingencies Also resource commitments are usually greater in full 
control operations often involving deployment of assets that cannot 
be redeployed without considerable sunk costs(Hill, 1990) Such 
assets also constitute exit barriers limiting strategic flexibility and 
thereby increasing venture risks. (Herrmann and Datta, 2002) 
Overall, higher control leads to higher risk modes, given the 
resource commitment, switching costs and exposures (Anderson 
and Gatignon, 1986) Consequently making greenfield a high 
risk/return alternative in contrast to joint venture allowing lower 
amount of investment. The choice of entry mode can be viewed as a 
strategic decision in which firms make trade-offs between resource 
commitment and degree of risk. In managing risk greenfield 
requires entrants to develop own knowledge base and competencies, 
a burden to be offset by expected performance. 
The above concept suggests that risk-aversive CEOs are likely 
to favor modes that involve lower resource commitments thereby 
joint ventures. However, Risk-seeking CEOs are likely to become 
more comfortable going with more control even though it requires 
higher resource commitments and investment risks. Thus 




Hypothesis 2: The stronger the risk-aversive behaviors of the CEO, 
the less likely foreign entrants are to choose fully-controlled 
Greenfield operation. 
 
However, the likelihood of facing malfunctioning markets varies 
with the characteristics of the CEO, especially regarding the risk-
management. Some managers are more risk-averse than 
shareholders’  expectations (Eisenhardt, 1989). CEOs have so 
much of their economic factors and reputations tied to their 
companies left as "underdiversified" and cannot help but lose a lot if 
companies suffer (Mil grom & Roberts, 1992). Thus, to avoid 
extreme sufferings, managers would avoid taking risky actions. 
Shareholders, in contrast, are widely diversified, left as risk-
neutral and allowed to pursuit maximize returns. In this respect, 
agency theory suggests concept of correlation of risk & return 
(Fama, 1976) Prescriptions about how to “promote managerial 
risk taking” include diverse incentive systems to motivate CEOs. 
By aligning the incentive system, CEO characteristics can change, 
from risk-aversive to risk-seeking, allowing diverse spectrum 
regarding the acquired attitude towards the risk. CEO tenure, 
education level, age, functional background, and many other factors 
could influence CEO’s attitude towards the risk as well. 
  Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) may provide an 
explanation for how individuals actually make decisions regarding a 
bundle of financial resources. That is, “losses loom larger than 
gains” for decision makers (Einhorn and Hogarth 1981; Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). Managers exhibit loss aversion and prospect 
theory is used to explain why loss has a stronger influence on 
decision than positive gains, and its asymmetric effect (Anderson 
and Sullivan, 1993) However, if the assumption that people tend to 
avoid risk is not qualified, the proposition that the amount of loss is 
more magnified than amount of the gain cannot be qualified. Instead, 
if the assumption is not met, CEOs can presume that the amount of 
loss is not that great to consider, and rather choose risky options as 
greenfield, expecting more gain. Therefore, the effect of H2a will 
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2.4 Institutions+ CEO characteristics 
 
To examine how dimensions of institutions and CEO characteristics 
interact, consider two extreme cases. If institutions are very weak 
and cannot ensure efficient mechanism, foreign entrants cannot 
expect the proper role of the market (cells 1-3). Entrants cannot 
choose the option of acquisition as may be too costly due to 
financial markets’  inefficiency. Moreover, it is likely that the 
CEO’s decisions could not be properly evaluated and their rational 
decision-making could be challenging. Therefore, foreign entrants 
seeking local resources would prefer the partnership with a local 
firm, with both side’s contribution and shared control. This would 
apply to both risk aversive and risk neutral CEOs, as long as they 
are assumed to be rational decision-makers considering 
circumstances (cells 2 and 3) In rare cases, acquisitions are 
suitable for cell2 as well, as suggested by Meyer. 
  In the opposite extreme case with strong institutional power, 
companies can fully rely on market to arrange transactions (cells 
4-6), greenfield entry arising as a possible option. Greenfield 
would not posit substantial challenges for risk-neutral CEOs (cell 
5). However, the risk of market failure would still affect 
transactions for risk-aversive CEOs. No matter how much the 
institution is developed, one cannot get rid of the risk in ‘starting 
from scratch.’ Greenfield operation is distinct from Acquisition in 
that it does not allow exploiting previous organizations’ resources 
or capabilities. For risk-aversive CEOs, the market related risk 
defers them from choosing Greenfield but relatively developed 
institutional context allows them to choose acquisition, which will 
benefit from the degree of the institutional development. (cell 6) 
This is done by comparing the relative risk among entry modes. 
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That is, choosing acquisition rather than joint venture in developed 
institutional context is rational in that it is balancing advantages 
such as access to local knowledge, more control, speedy operation 
and disadvantage about difficulty in assessing value; exploiting the 
opportunities for investors. 
  Therefore, under strong institutions, the market is relatively 
efficient and enables firms to engage in Greenfield operations (cell 
4,5). But this is only when considering solely institutional effect. If 
CEO, the ultimate decision maker ’ s attitude towards risk is 
considered as influential enough, companies cannot easily risk the 
burden of full-ownership, avoiding Greenfield operations. (cell 6) 
Therefore, hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis3: Even considering for the institutional effect(H1), the 
greater the tendency of CEOs for risk-aversion, the more likely they 
are to use acquisition or JV rather than Greenfield. 
 
One thing to note also is that under conditions of strong institutions, 
neglectable need of CEOs for risk-aversion will not influence the 
choice of entry mode. 
 
 










Selected samples for this paper were initially based on 157 
manufacturers listed on the Korea Exchange. In order to select 
firms that are adequately executing overseas expansion strategy, 
companies above certain size (determined by total asset-over 200 
billion won) were chosen. Considering the fact that more than 50% 
of the total Investment in Korea accounts for the manufacturing 
companies and also, to control for the difference among industries, 
samples were confined to manufacturing companies. 
The period was set in 2015, after the global financial crisis in 
2008.The global economic downturn since 2008 has been evident, 
referred to as the era of low-growth. In this new normal era, many 
Korean companies were struggling with overseas expansion in 
entering foreign markets and this paper aims to focus on this aspect.     
Among total of 157 listed manufacturing companies, only those 
which went public and engaged in foreign direct investment in 2015 
more than once were screened to be 126 companies. As a result 
total 531 observations were made during 5 years. In order to find a 
cross-country sample which has a wide range in the independent 
variable, yet, confined range difference in other factors, this paper 
confined the context in Korean companies entering Asian markets. 
Although selected countries share similar culture, they prominently 
differ in the institutional context.  
At first, the paper aimed to focus on‘4 dragons’ in Asia, which 
is a term used to refer to the rapidly-developing economies of 
South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. This was to 
control for the interference companies might face if confronted with 
dramatic cultural or economic difference. Since the paper focuses 
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on Korean companies, it seemed reasonable to confine the market 
to Asian countries, especially to include Taiwan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong which have all long been argued to share commonalities 
with South Korea. In addition, these countries were noticeable for 
high growth rates and rapid industrialization from 60s to 90s, 
sharing a lot of common features like emphasis on education and 
Asian values. But if confined to these countries, the difference of 
institutional development would not be wide enough, so more 
countries had to be added to the sample. But still, they all share 
similarities which can be attributed to being located in Asia. By 
adding four more countries- Vietnam, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Japan-this paper aims to focus more on the influence the 
institutional development exert on the choice of entry mode. When 
looking at information, one can see that annual GDP growth rate 
differs slightly but not in a drastic way. To be specific, GDP growth 
rate was 6% in Vietnam, 1% in Thailand, 3% in Turkey, 4% in 
Taiwan, 0% in Japan, 3% in Singapore, and 2% in Hong Kong, 
ranging from 0% to 6%. After some consideration, China was 
deleted from the sample market in that it showed more than 8% of 
growth rate and in so many ways possessed features of outliers, 
such as in size and different political values, regarding the overall 
institutional development. All seven countries have shown steady 
FDI inflows, compared with other countries, such as 
underdeveloped Africa or Europe which recently went through 
economic crisis.  
Variations in the degree of the institutional development is 
evident in that Hong Kong shows highly developed financial market 
while Vietnam and Thailand fails to do so. However, the institutional 
environment has been developing each in its own ways in 7 
countries- evolving particularly prominently in Vietnam (Meyer and 
Nguyen, 2005), also shown in its highest GDP growth rate of 6% 
among other countries. All in all, the difference among countries 
explicates that data from these Asian economies can show how 
institutional development influence company’s entry modes of FDI. 
  Collecting the data for the paper was not without trouble, 
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especially considering the fact that cross-border M&As were rare 
for Korean companies, although the other way around- Foreign 
companies merging Korean companies happened occasionally. With 
some help from SDC platinum and mostly from Kotra, data from 7 
countries were collected without additional interviews or surveys. 
Initial samples were based on 157 manufacturers listed on the 
Korea Exchange. However, after getting rid of many companies that 
do not suffice these conditions and several check-ups, not many 
companies were left to be measured to support hypotheses. It was 
necessary to confine the Industry to a more confined sector, in 
which degree of the institutional development actually plays a big 
role.  
 
3.1.2. Biotechnology Industry 
 
Thereby, the paper acquired the data on Kotra with additional 
restraint on the industry and underwent in-depth analysis in 
Biotechnology sector. Again, it was confined to Korean companies 
only and the data was acquired from online source. 
(http://www.koreanbiotech.com) The samples included not only 
big-sized companies but small-sized companies as well.   
Why Biotechnology Industry, then? This paper tried to provide 
some insight with respect to near future. Today, development of 
Biotechnology industry is referred to as another revolution, after 
what became known as IT revolution. What is more, Biotechnology 
is predicted to exert much bigger influence in the global market 
than Information technology as an economic engine to create 
subsequent value. That’s why Korean Government has been 
promoting FDI in the industry. Korea is relatively small in land size 
and is not abundant in other natural resources other than human 
resource, which makes knowledge-intensive Biotechnology 
industry suitable for the country.  
This industry is assessed to be not only knowledge-intensive but 
also infrastructure-intensive(Shan,1997). And its infrastructure-
intensive characteristic is related to important role of the 
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government and the development of the institution. With the 
industry’s dependence on institution such as property rights, patent, 
anti-trust laws, and laws regarding not only technologies but also 
health and fundamental rights to secure quality of life, this industry 
is highly influenced by the development of the institution, relevant 
to other industry sectors. (Pereira, 2006) That is, institutional 
framework is critical for biotechnology firms to survive. 
Unnecessary regulations prevent biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
companies from investing, considering the heavy dependence on 
patents and intellectual rights with reliance on R&D, it is no 
surprising that United states, the most developed institution, 
account for the disproportionately large size of the market sector in 
Biotechnology (Rugman, 2005, p.118). Pharmaceutical companies 
are more directly discouraged from investing when drugs or other 
related products are controlled by governments in approval 
processes and regulated in setting the price with the market 
mechanism, because the scale of the investment and degree of the 
government regulation tend to be stronger than in other industry 
sectors. (Chase-Dunn, Lara-Millan and Niedmeyer, 2004) 
  The confinement of the industry made it easier to classify CEO’s 
attitude towards risk as well, since the investment in Biotechnology 
is bigger in scale, meaning more risk-involved decisions to be 
taken. The additional trouble, however, was concerning how to 
measure CEO’s perceptions of the risk, or namely, their attitude 






3.2.1.Main Variables and Models 
 
Dependent Variables 
Dependent variable for the paper is a categorical factor, as the 
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figure of 1 is for greenfiled, 2 is for acquisition and 3 is for JV. 
Therefore, Multinomial Regression had to be conducted measuring 
their marginal effects. These entry modes were distinguished by 
information on Kotra. By using M-Logit regression model to 
measure the effect of the independent variables on the odds among 
each entry modes will be chosen, two models were necessary to 
account for the moderating effect of the CEO’s willingness to take 
the risk.  
 
Independent Variables    
Institutions. According to previous literature, the power of 
institutions to enhance market-mechanism can be measured by five 
figures in the economic freedom index from the Heritage foundation 
(Kane et al, 2007), which implies relevant data of the country’s 
institutions. It emphasizes on the liberty the market allows to 
foreign entrants or local firms in business. Originally the 
information is allocated to ten different factors; property rights, 
freedom from corruption, fiscal freedom, government spending, 
business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, 
investment freedom, and financial freedom. However, previous 
literature focuses on only variables of five categories, which are 
business freedom, trade freedom, property rights, investment 
freedom and financial freedom. This was to directly measure the 
effectiveness of mechanism regarding the mechanism. While Meyer 
used the information available back in 2007, this paper updated the 
index from the most recent data, published in 2016. That is, the 
new 5-index was calculated based on ten categories from 2016 
publication, selecting five categories in accordance with previous 
literature, summing and making an average figure, measuring the 
new 5-index to reflect the development of the institution. This new 
index showed considerable variation; 44.3(Vietnam), 
60.8(Thailand), 65(Turkey), 76.9(Taiwan), 75(Japan), 





CEO’s attitude towards risk. Since it is hard to directly measure 
CEO’s attitude towards risk, which incorporates very subjective 
characteristics of mindset in managers, it seemed reasonable to 
survey and interview CEOs or make questionnaires. But this was 
not only time-consuming but also posed the danger of being 
interpreted more subjectively and being distorted. Therefore, as a 
way to capture the CEO’s attitude towards risk in a more objective 
manner, reflected in the outward source, content analysis was held 
to measure this CEO characteristics. According to the result from 
the content analysis, this paper defined the index to define CEO’s 
attitude towards risk, classified as risk-aversive, risk-neutral, or 
risk-seeking.  
 
However, relying solely on content analysis might be risky in that 
it poses a possibility of leading to a biased result. Other figures that 
reflect CEO’s attitude towards risk are as follows. CEO 
innovativeness can be defined as an opposite notion of CEO CSQ, 
which refers to the degree of strength in executive’s belief about 
firm’s current strategies or profiles. (Mcclelland et al, 2010)  
*CEO Innovativeness 
CEO innovativeness will be measured as a reverse index from CEO 
CSQ  
CEO innovativeness= 1/CEO CSQ 
CEO CSQ = ((ln No. of dictionary words in CEO’ s letter to 
shareholders + 2)) × -1). 
Logging the data(natural logarithm) would reduce the size of this 
tail and create a more normal distribution. 
*Dictionary words for CEO Innovativeness: 
(a) risk, (b) take (c) initiate, (d) innovate, (e) introduce, (f) launch, 
(g) reposition, (h) transform (i) change (j) create  
Given that none of the firms were included in the final sample for 
the study and coders read through more than 50 letters according 
to the article, this word-list from 「CEO Commitment to the Status 
Quo: Replication and Extension Using Content Analysis」  seems 
reliable. Other words that I came up with are as follows: 
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(i)transition  (j)shift  (k) lead 





Three factors to control for mentioned in the previous literature, in 
examining the hypotheses are as follows; Parent companies, the 
country of origin and the host economy. By focusing on Korean 
companies investing in Asian markets, the influence or interference 
by variance from parent companies, the country of origin or the 
host economy is mitigated, That is, although it cannot be controlled 
perfectly, it is relatively minimized as the variance is narrowed both 
for nationality of the parent companies (Korea), and market to be 
enter (Asian countries with commonalities).  
 
Parent company. Prior research suggests that parent firms are 
major interfering factors for subsidiaries in making a key decision. 
For instance, firms producing unique product lines or firms based on 
secret know-hows are bound to prefer Greenfield operation rather 
than Joint venture, since it would not want key intangible resources 
in maintaining competitive advantage to be revealed to competitors. 
Therefore, this research includes a dummy variable to take the 
figure of 1 when parent is a conglomerate MNE and 0 when it is not.  
 
 Local context. Although local markets all share the commonality 
of being located in Asia, GDP varies from $397.5 billion to $4750.8. 
GDP shows the market size of the local economy to be controlled 
for. Also, by confining the industry sector to manufacturing 
companies, the influence exerted by the characteristics of the 
industry in the local economy can be alleviated. In addition, this 
research aims to control for the influence depending on time which 
for instance, includes overall fluctuation of the local economy. By 
focusing on the year 2015 the influence from changes in business 




Country of origin. As the nationality of the entering companies 
could interfere with the decision in entry modes, (Hennart and 
Larimo, 1998) as explained above, only Korean companies were 
selected as samples. This way the tendency in choosing certain 
entry mode, arising from the country of origin will be minimized. 
The research in the field of cooperative actions among companies 
emphasizes the role of the country of origin of the company. This 
paper minimizes the country-of-the-origin effect by concentrating 
only on Korean companies, and confining the market to Asian 
countries. By focusing on Korean companies in Asian market and 
comparing within the group (Hagedoorn, 1994) we can control for 
the possible interference. 
 
Environmental change. Past research shows that when 
environment gets turbulent, firms tend to engage in competitive 
behavior. Year 2015 was chosen not only because it was most 
recent year but also as it seemed to be less fluctuating and less 
contingent to environmental factors since economic crisis in 2008. 
Minor changes in the market environment or firm-level changes, 
such as change of CEO and BOD will be considered and controlled 


















The results of examining hypotheses are shown as follows. As this 
paper used multinomial regression model, Two models are made. 
Model 1 only reflects the direct influence from both institutions and 
CEO ’ s attitude towards risk while model 2 incorporates the 
moderating effect as well. Model 2 presents higher Wald and R2 
statistics, reflecting the existence of moderating effect of CEO’s 
characteristics. This model’ s prediction shows higher rate of 
accuracy as well.(Table1) 
The results are mixed, varying in each entry mode of Joint 
venture, M&A, and Greenfield. As for Hypothesis 1, the statement 
that if the institutional strength is firm enough companies would not 
prefer JV was supported in case of Joint venture. In case of M&As, 
largely due to lack of samples, especially outward cross-border 
M&As, the results did not support Hypothesis 1, and 2 as well. As 
for Greenfield, the results were different using the models with 
(model 2) or without interaction models.(model 1) 
In case of Hypothesis 2, the regression results strongly 
supported the case of Greenfield and weakly supported the case of 
JV. The figures in JV were correctly signed in model 1, without 
interaction effects but were not significant enough in model 2, with 
the interaction effects. 
With respect to Hypothesis 3, it showed support except for M&As, 
which leads us this paper to conclude that institutional effect and 
CEO’s attitude towards risk do interact. Development of the 
institutional framework encourages acquisitions and Greenfield 
operations while discouraging Joint Ventures. However, even when 
institutional power is strong, foreign investments will still choose 
Joint venture depending on the characteristics of the ultimate 
decision maker, CEO and subsequently firm’s attitude towards risk. 
The tendency to choose JV even in the strong institutional 
framework seem to be more prominent in the Biotechnology 
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industry, since the knowledge or intangible assets tend to be shared 
among top managers confidentially, including important information 
that crucially influences the decision-making process. The fact that 
the decision in Biotechnology industry involves more risky 









Previous research focused on the integration of institution-based 
view and Resource-based view, especially in entry strategies of 
developing countries. This paper makes different contributions in 
both theoretical perspective and practical perspective. 
  Theoretically, this paper argue that (1) if the institutional 
strength is firm enough, companies would not prefer JV, when 
choosing an entry mode, (2) The stronger the risk-aversive 
behaviors of the CEO, the less likely foreign entrants are to choose 
Greenfield operation and that (3) Even considering for the 
institutional effect (H1), the greater the tendency of CEOs for risk-
aversion, the more likely they are to use JV (or in rare case 
Acquisition) rather than Greenfield. This integration of analysis 
could enrich not only Institution Theory but also Upper Echelons 
Theory as well, by focusing on the relationship between two frames. 
This integration also has its meaning in that it considers both 
internal mindset of the decision-maker and the external 
environment, the institution. This perspective calling for 
simultaneous analysis of both internal and external environment of 
the decision-making process additionally has meaning in that it 
combines both subjective and objective analysis. In this respect, 
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this paper makes contribution in specifying the notion of ‘Risk.’ 
Previous research of Entry strategies tended to focus on ‘Cost’ in 
decision making process of the entry modes. This paper focuses on 
‘Risk’ instead, but this notion of risk can include the concept of cost 
as well, since bigger risk is normally intertwined with bigger cost. 
While cost is solely represented in an objective figure, risk could 
incorporate both cost side and perceptional side, reflecting the 
variance of the meaning the same cost conveys towards different 
companies.  
  Another contribution of this research is related to its practical 
implication in the field of Biotechnology Industry. It is now a global 
trend for many countries and their governments to promote the 
development of Biotechnology by encouraging biotechnology-
related industrial or economic policies. Biotechnology is important 
in future not only in that it is predicted as post-IT engine to 
promote revolutionary profit and cut down unemployment rate but 
for social reasons. Except for few countries leading the up-to-date 
Biotechnology, many countries lack proper resources to support 
domestic biotech companies. (Khoury,2011)Therefore, attracting 
foreign direct investments to transfer expertise and intangible 
assets to local firms is crucial in a long-term perspective for 
industrial growth, indicating why many governments rely on FDI-
oriented biotech policies (Pownall, 2000). This transfer is usually 
formed by joint-ventures, but in accordance with the suggested 
hypotheses, varies depending upon the entering country’s 
institutional strength and entrants’ (more specifically 
CEO’s)attitude towards risk. Even if it is convenient for entrants to 
choose joint venture, companies tend to avoid JV in developed 
institution and at the same time prefer JV when CEO is risk-
aversive. 
 






Main limitation of this paper is that China was excluded as the 
entering market in the samples, even though China accounts for 
large amount of investment in the industry. However, the 5-index 
to represent the development of the institution was 44.3 in case of 
China, lower than that of Vietnam(60.8)If China is included the 
positive relationship of institution with Greenfield operation is 
refuted due to its high rate of inward Greenfield flow. This is mainly 
due to the country’s economic scale, since China is still an 
attractive market especially in its scale even considering for its 
underdeveloped institutional framework. This trait of China led the 
paper to set China as an outlier, but if included the results might 
have showed totally different figures. 
Second limitation is that the samples were confined to Korean 
companies. Although this could be a way to control for country-of-
origin effects, or other possible bias, if other country’s information 
was used, there might have been more implications as well. In 
addition, there were few data regarding the acquisitions. There 
were not enough samples of outward cross-border M&As and this 
might have influenced the results. 
 
5.2.2. Future Research 
 
Existing studies suggest that older managers are more risk- averse 
than younger executives. Less aged CEOs can take more risk even 
if they are likely to fail, because they have a far more career to 
develop. They are allowed to make few mistakes since they expect 
enough time to recover from the after-mess. But older executives 
avoid taking risk because shorter spans of career await them. They 
just have too much to let go since they gained a lot from their 
previous career, relatively to young CEOs (MacCrimmon, 1986). 
Also, research results show that as people get older, they are likely 
to become more stiff, stubborn, and unfriendly to change. 
(Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) Even common sense tells us how 
older people stick to the prejudice. Aged executives, as well, 
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possess a rigid cluster of problem-solving schema, in which they 
have full trust of ‘experience’. Therefore, older executives would 
often refuse to jeopardize financial security with risky decisions and 
thus avoid innovation. However, after conducting content analysis 
from websites of the companies, this argument was not fully 
supported and in fact, aged CEOs tended to make riskier decisions 
in Biotechnology industry. This question and also many other 
questions to contradict previous literature await future research 
In addition, for instance, increased tenure is known to increase 
CEO’s stake involved in maintaining status quo (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick, 1996). The success record of long-tenured CEOs may 
produce overconfidence leading to critical mistakes or missing out 
new opportunities (Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Miller, 1991; 
Musteen, Barker, & Baeten, 2006). In addition, CEO power 
increases with tenure and they recruit second-tier managers with 
similar tendency. (Mintzberg, 1983). Lower level managers have no 
choice but to make a decision that suits CEO’s point of view. This 
hinders CEOs from seeing the need for change. In other words, 
CEOs often fail to take risk in innovation and to make new 
investments, with increasing tenure. However, this was not the case 
for rapidly developing industries. Thereby future research could 
concentrate on how technology-oriented industry, namely Biotech 
nology changes CEO’s behavior especially in their risk-taking 
tendencies and focus on CEO’s other characteristics such as tenure 
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지난 연구들은 기업이 추구하는 자원의 특성과 제도의 상호작용에 초점
을 맞추어 왔다. 그러나 이는 자원이 유형, 무형 자원 중 하나로 구분된
다는 것 뿐만 아니라 제도의 발전 정도와 추구되는 자원의 경향성은 무
관하다는 전제를 내포하고 있다. 유, 무형을 막론하고 다양한 자원을 추
구하는 기업의 경향성과 발전된 제도 하에서의 무형 자원 추구 성향을 
감안한다면 지난 연구의 실질적인 의의는 반감된다. 이에 따라 본 논문
은 기업의 진입 전략에 결정적인 새로운 축을 재고하여 기업의 최종 결
정권자인 CEO의 특성 중 위험에 대한 태도가 이를 반영함을 보인다. 비
용과 같은 맥락에서 위험이 기업의 해외 직접 투자 전략에 미치는 영향
을 고려할 때, 투자 전략의 선택에 있어서 제도의 발전 정도에 따라 달
라지는 위험은 해외신설투자, 기업인수합병, 합작투자의 선택에 있어 
CEO의 태도를 통한 조절효과를 반영함을 제시하고자 한다. CEO의 위기 
관리와 제도의 영향력이 극대화 될 수 있는 한국의 바이오 산업을 중심
으로 이를 검증한다.  
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